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The eavesdropping scheme proposed by Wo´jcik [Phys. Rev. Lett. 90,157901(2003)] on
the ping-pong protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902(2002)] is improved by constituting
a new set of attack operations. The improved scheme has a zero eavesdropping-induced
channel loss and produces perfect anticorrelation. Therefore, the eavesdropper Eve
can safely attack all the transmitted bits and the eavesdropping information gain can
always exceed the legitimate user’s information gain in the whole domain of the quantum
channel transmission efficiency η, i.e., [0,100%]. This means that the ping-pong proto-
col can be completely eavesdropped in its original version. But the improvement of the
ping-pong protocol security produced by Wo´jcik is also suitable for our eavesdropping attack.
PACS number(s): 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
The private key bits can be produced between two remote parties by use of quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD). QKD is a provably secure protocol since the security of QKD is based on fundamental
laws of quantum physics. Many theoretical research works [2-20] have been focused on QKD since
the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984 [1]. These QKD protocols are
non-deterministic since the sender cannot determine the bit value that receiver will finally decode.
Different from this kind of non-deterministic QKDs, the deterministic secure direct communication
protocol is to transmit directly the secret messages without first generating QKD to encrypt them.
This makes it very useful and usually desired, especially in some urgent time. However, the de-
terministic secure direct communication is more demanding on the security than non-deterministic
QKDs. Therefore, only recently a few of deterministic secure direct protocols are proposed [21-24].
One of them is the famous Bostro¨m-Felbinger protocol, or ping-pong protocol [22], which allows
the generation of a deterministic key or even direct secret communication.
In ping-pong protocol[22,25], Bob prepares two photons in the entangled state |Ψ+〉 = (|0〉|1〉+
|1〉|0〉)/√2. He stores one photon (home photon) in his lab and sends Alice the other one (travel
photon) via a quantum channel. After receiving the travel photon Alice randomly switches between
the control mode and the message mode. In the control mode Alice measures the polarization of
the travel photon first in the z-basis and then announces publicly the measurement result. After
knowing Alice’s announcement Bob also switches to the control mode to measure the home photon
in the same basis as that Alice used. Then he compares both measurement results. They should
be perfectly anticorrelated in the absence of Eve. Therefore, the appearance of identical results is
2considered to be the evidence of eavesdropping, and if it occurs the transmission is aborted. In the
other case, the transmission continues. In the message mode, Alice performs the Zjt (j ∈ {0, 1})
operation on the travel photon to encode j and sends it back to Bob, where Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|.
After receiving the travel photon Bob measures the state of both photons in the Bell basis to decode
the j = 0(1) corresponding to the |Ψ+〉(|Ψ−〉) result.
The ping-pong protocol has been claimed to be secure and experimentally feasible[22]. However,
since there is a separation of the verification procedure and the key generation in the ping-pong
protocol, Wo´jcik has presented an undetectable eavesdropping scheme on the Bostro¨m-Felbinger
protocol[25]. His eavesdropping attack produces the eavesdropping-induced channel loss, therefore,
requires a lossy channel to work, otherwise the eavesdropper can be detected by observing the
eavesdropping-induced channel loss. Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme produces the eavesdropping-
induced channel loss at the level of 50% and the anticorrelation of the state of the home photon
(kept by Bob, the legitimate receiver of secret messages) with that of the travel photon (sent by Bob
to Alice, the sender of secret messages). If the transmission efficiency η of the quantum channel is
not taken into account, the probability of the eavesdropper (i.e., Eve) being detected is zero due to
the anticorrelation. However, in the case of the considerable quantum channel losses, it is possible
for legitimate users to detect the eavesdropping by observing the quantum channel losses. That is,
although Eve can attack all the transmitted bits and the eavesdropping-induced channel loss can be
hidden in the channel losses when η ≤ 50%, if she attacks all the transmitted bits when η > 50%,
then the eavesdropping-induced channel loss is greater than the channel losses and accordingly the
legitimate users can find Eve in the line by observing the channel losses.
Since Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme produces the eavesdropping-induced channel loss at the
level of 50%, it is desirable to have an eavesdropping scheme on the ping-pong protocol without
eavesdropping-induced channel loss. To construct his attacking protocol[25], Wo´jcik lets Eve use
both the unitary operation and the auxiliary system. since Eve is limited only by the laws of
quantum mechanics, but not at all by current technology[2], she is free to use any unitary oper-
ation. In this paper, we will improve the Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme [25] by using the same
auxiliary system but different set of attack operations. Our improved eavesdropping scheme indeed
produces zero eavesdropping-induced channel loss and never produces both identical results of the
measurements performed by Bob and Alice in the control mode.
Obviously, Eve has no access to the home photon but can manipulate the travel photon while
it goes from Bob to Alice and back from Alice to Bob. Eve uses two auxiliary spatial modes x, y.
She prepares a photon in the state |0〉 and lets the other one be an empty mode, e.g., in the state
|vac〉x|0〉y. Accordingly, the state of the whole system including the entangled photon pair is
|initial〉 = |Ψ+〉ht|vac〉x|0〉y. (1)
which is the same as Wo´jcik’s. When Bob sends the travel photon to Alice, Eve attacks the quantum
channel by manipulating the travel photon through a unitary operation (referred as to be the B−A
attack hereafter) as follow,
Wtxy = UtxyVtxyQtxy, (2)
3where
Utxy = |0〉〈0|y ⊗ SWAPtx + (Iy − |0〉〈0|y)⊗ Itx, (3)
Vtxy = |1〉〈1|y ⊗ SWAPtx + (Iy − |1〉〈1|y)⊗ Itx, (4)
I is an identity operator, and Qtxy is defined in [25] as
Qtxy = SWAPtxCPBStxyHy, (5)
which is composed of the Hadamard gate, the SWAP gate, and the three-mode gate which is called
the controlled polarizing beam splitter (CPBS) by Wo´jcik. When acting on the initial state, the
B −A attack transforms the whole system to the state |B −A〉 =Wtxy|initial〉 of the form
|B −A〉 = 1
2
|0〉h|1〉t(|vac〉x|0〉y + |1〉x|vac〉y) + 1
2
|1〉h|0〉t(|vac〉x|1〉y + |0〉x|vac〉y). (6)
Suppose that Alice now switches to the control mode and measures the state of the mode t.
According to equation (6), we can see that after the B-A attack Alice will detect with 100% certainty
a photon whose state is perfectly anticorrelated with the state of the home photon. Therefore, the
probability of eavesdropping detection based on the correlation observation equals zero. This point
is completely same as that in Ref.[25]. Moreover, from equation (6) we can also see that the
B − A attack in the present eavesdropping scheme produces zero eavesdropping-induced channel
loss. In contrast, the eavesdropping-induced channel losses in [25] arrives at 50%. This implies
that, comparing to the Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme, in the present eavesdropping scheme, the
domain in which Eve can attack all the transmitted bits is enlarged to [0, 100%] from the [0, 50%] in
Ref.[25]. Nonetheless, this does not certainly mean that the insecurity upper bound of transmission
efficiency presented by Wo´jcik can be pushed up, for now we still do not know the variation of the
eavesdropping (legitimate) information gain. Let us now analyze the performance of the scheme
in the case of Alice operating in the message mode. After Alice performs the Zj operation and
sends the travel photon back to Bob, Eve performs her second attack (named as the A−B attack
hereafter) on the travel photon. The A − B attack consists of the unitary operation W−1txy. After
the A−B attack, the corresponding state of the whole system is
|A−B〉j = 1
2
[(−1)j(Ψ+ht +Ψ−ht)|j〉y + (Ψ+ht −Ψ−ht)|0〉y]|vac〉x, (7)
which is little different from the corresponding state in [25] due to the existence of the partial phase
factor (−1)j.
The final step of the eavesdropping scheme is a measurement of polarization performed on the
y photon. The measurement result is denoted as k, while Bob’s Bell-state measurement on both
photons is denoted as m = 0(1) corresponding to the |Ψ+〉ht(|Ψ−〉ht) state. Assuming that Alice
sends both values of j with the same probability, then the only nonzero probabilities pjkm of possible
measurement outputs are
p000 = 1/2, p100 = p101 = p110 = p111 = 1/8. (8)
4which is the same as Wo´jcik’s. Therefore, the quantum bit error rate induced by the eavesdropping
in the present eavesdropping scheme is also at the same level of 1/4 as that in Ref.[25]. And the
mutual information between any two parties can be easily worked out,
IAE = IAB =
3
4
log2
4
3
≈ 0.311
IBE = 1− 3
2
log2 3 +
5
8
log2 5 ≈ 0.074. (9)
The same as Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme, the present scheme is also not symmetric. If after
the A− B attack Eve performs with the probability of 1/2 an additional unitary operation Sty =
XtZtCNOTtyXtZt, where Xt is an negation, then the asymmetry can be removed. If the present
Sty is performed, then the state of the whole system evolves to
|A−B〉(S)j = Sty|A−B〉j =
1
2
[(Ψ+ht +Ψ
−
ht)|j〉y + (−1)j(Ψ+ht −Ψ−ht)|1〉y]|vac〉x. (10)
Note that the present operation Sty is different from that in [25]. According to the viewpoint in
Ref.[25], that is, since Eve knows exactly when each of the Sty operations has been performed, the
symmetrization procedure does not reduce the mutual information between Alice and Eve while it
disturbs the communication between Alice and Eve in such a way the mutual information between
Alice and Bob is reduced. In the present scheme after the symmetrization procedure the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is also reduced to IAB =
3
4 log2 3− 1 ≈ 0.189.
Thus far, we have improved Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme by constructing a new set of attack
operations. We can see that the improved scheme is almost the same as Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping
scheme except for the eavesdropping-induced channel loss. Hence, all the discussions in Ref.[25]
except for those related to the eavesdropping-induced channel loss are also suitable for the present
paper and we will not repeat them. Now let us discuss a very important property related to the
eavesdropping-induced channel loss. In the improved scheme the η domain in which Eve can attack
all the transmitted bits is enlarged to [0, 100%] from [0, 50%] in Ref.[25]. In the η domain of (50%,
100%], the eavesdropping information gain does not decrease in the improved scheme but it does
decrease in Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme. Thus, in this sense, we can say that the present zero
eavesdropping-induced channel loss does induce more eavesdropping information gain. Hence, the
ping-pong protocol in its original version is insecure and can be completely eavesdropped, even in
an ideal channel. Although in [22] the security proof against eavesdropping is provided, we think,
it is essentially not a general proof but only the result of a special choice of the ancilla. Our present
eavesdropping scheme employing two ancillas from Wo´jcik instead of one ancilla in [22] has shown
the insecurity of ping-pong protocol.
In summary, we have improved Wo´jcik’s eavesdropping scheme on the Bostro¨m-Felbinger quan-
tum communication protocol. The improved scheme does not produce any eavesdropping-induced
channel loss and accordingly in the whole η domain of [0, 100%] Eve can attack all the transmitted
bits. Hence, in the η domain of (50%,100%], the zero eavesdropping-induced channel loss does
induce more eavesdropping information gain. Moreover, as for as the original ping-pong proto-
col is concerned, it is insecure and can be completely eavesdropped, even in an ideal channel, for
the eavesdropping information gain can always exceed the legitimate user’s information gain. As
mentioned by Wo´jcik[25], the ping-pong protocol can be made secure against his attack scheme
5by a modification. His improvement of the ping-pong protocol security is also suitable for our
eavesdropping attack. Actually there is a significant chance of finding an additional photon in the
travel mode in our attack, which can then be used as an indicator for Eve’s presence. The present
eavesdropping scheme introduces a qubit error rate at the same level of 25% as one for Wo´jcik’s
attack scheme. If the channel has itself a QBER significantly lower than 25%, and if Alice and
Bob sacrifice some of their message bits to perform message authentification, the qubit error rate
induced by the attack can be used to detect the eavesdropper. Furthermore, another improvement
of the ping-pong protocol is that, if both Alice and Bob use the generally used two-measuring-basis
method [23] in the control mode, our present eavesdropping attack can also be detected with 25%
possibility.
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